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Abstract 
Many United States employees are regularly asked to give charitable donations through 
work. The techniques used to solicit workplace donations vary. Drawing on a nationally 
representative survey, the study used a sample of donor responses to examine the 
effectiveness of several widely used campaign strategies—donor choice, company 
matching, public recognition, and solicitation support. The theoretical framework built on 
workplace research by Barman (2007) and established charitable giving mechanisms 
(Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a, 2011b). The research question was, Do workplace 
campaign strategies lead employees to participate and to make (larger) donations in the 
workplace? The positive outcomes of the strategies, aside from donor choice, were 
limited, suggesting that “tried and true” workplace fundraising strategies warrant 
additional scrutiny. The findings are meaningful to campaign managers seeking to 
identify approaches that generate workplace giving. For researchers, the results confirm 
growing attention to the importance of purpose-based giving in comparison with 
community-based giving. 
___________________________________________________________________
This is the author's manuscript of the article published in final edited form as:
Shaker, G.G., Christensen, R.K., & Bergdoll, J.J. (2017). What Works at Work? Toward an Integrative Model Examining Workplace 
Campaign Strategies. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 28(1), 25–46. https://doi.org/10.1002/nml.21270
 1 
Introduction 
The workplace is a social environment in which employees are asked to behave 
philanthropically . Under the umbrella of “workplace giving,” employees make donations—with 
employer endorsement, often in the form of a campaign—for charitable purposes. Workplace 
giving campaigns, organized efforts which provide employees with tools to facilitate 
philanthropy, are a regular part of occupational life across all sectors domestically and abroad 
(Barman 2006; Haski-Leventhal 2013).  
 Partly due to the variety of workplace giving methods within an even more diverse 
system of organizations, documentation of workplace giving is somewhat limited. Workplace 
donations are thought to be sizeable, but the most recent national analysis of how sizeable took 
place  when Giving USA (2007) reported a workplace total of $4.2 billion. The United Way 
alone now raises approximately $3.5–$4.0 billion annually (Hrywna 2015).  
 Workplace giving may be at a turning point, making it more important to understand 
employee responses to workplace campaigning. Many in the United States work part-time and on 
a contractual basis, possibly influencing workers’ desire to participate in employer-led 
philanthropic efforts. Moreover, convenient tools now allow individuals to “emulate” payroll 
giving through automatic deductions from bank accounts and credit cards. Ample online 
platforms provide venues to deploy one’s own fundraising campaign and to participate in others’ 
private initiatives (for example, Donorschoose.org and Fundly.org) and technology now makes it 
eaiser for for smaller companies to participate in formal workplace campaigns. The newest 
generation of workers (millennials) is expressing strong interest in workplace giving 
participation (The Millennial Impact Project  2015). If organizations hope to continue to receive 
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substantial gifts through the workplace, it is imperative to understand what “works” in the 
workplace.  
 Drawing on a nationally representative survey, this study relied on a sample of donor 
responses to several widely used campaign strategies—donor choice, company matching, public 
recognition, and solicitation support. The theoretical framework built on workplace research by 
Barman (2007) and literature about charitable giving mechanisms (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a, 
2011b). The research question was, Do workplace campaign strategies lead employees to 
participate and to make (larger) donations in the workplace? While the existing, limited literature 
on workplace giving includes some assessment of campaign strategies—typically focused on a 
single organization or industry—we based our empirical analyses of these factors on a national 
survey and contextualize the findings with theory.  
Contextualizing Workplace Strategies: An Integrative Model 
Scholars provide several multilevel framing approaches to organize the myriad dynamics 
of philanthropic giving (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a) and workplace giving (Barman 2007; 
Nesbit, Christensen, and Gossett 2012). The Bekkers and Wiepking meta-analysis names eight 
mechanisms that influence philanthropic giving: awareness of need, altruism, values, solicitation, 
reputation, efficacy, costs and benefits, and psychological benefits. Locus matters and Bekkers 
and Wiepking  categorize the mechanisms to be within, between, or outside potential donors. 
Workplace and federated giving scholars similarly identify micro, meso/dyadic, and macro 
dynamics (Barman 2007; Nesbit et al. 2012). We draw upon the similarities of within-micro, 
between-meso, and outside-macro to position workplace campaigning in broader notions of 
giving (see Figure 1).  
Micro/Within Dynamics  
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The microlevel perspective focuses within an individual, and specifically on 
characteristics and traits—for example, demographic attributes that may correlate with 
philanthropic giving behavior (Barman 2007). Age is typically significant in giving, but 
workplace results are mixed, with only select studies finding significance (Agypt, Christensen, 
and Nesbit 2012; Bekkers and Wiepking 2011b; Borden, Shaker, and Kienker 2014; Haski-
Levanthal 2013; Osili, Hirt, and Raghavan 2011). A higher level of education is generally 
positively correlated to U.S. philanthropic giving (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011b), but Osili and 
colleagues (2011) found workplace donors to be less likely to have bachelor’s degrees than 
nonworkplace donors. Findings on gender in philanthropic giving are mixed (Bekkers and 
Wiepking 2011a). One workplace study found that women were more likely to participate than 
men (Carman 2004). Other workplace giving studies found race/ethnicity to be significant 
(Borden et al. 2014; Knight 2004), not necessarily in alignment with the general US giving. For 
example, Knight’s (2004) university-based study noted that Black employees were more likely to 
donate than Caucasian employees. A higher level of religious involvement is another common 
correlate to philanthropic giving, but most workplace giving studies lack the data to address this 
characteristic. One university-based study, however, didn’t find religious involvement to be 
significant (Nesbit et al. 2012) while a larger national study (Osili et al. 2011) determined that 
workplace donors attend religious service more frequently.  
This discussion of micro-within dynamics indicates, first, little consensus in the 
workplace regarding even commonly studied characteristics of philanthropic givers, and second, 
that workplace giving may vary in several regards from nonworkplace giving, perhaps because 
of a mediating effect from the workplace environment (Shaker et al. 2014). 
Meso/Dyadic/Between Dynamics 
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Meso- or dyadic-level dynamics focus on the exchange and relationships between the 
employer and the employee. Explorations of the “relational” or between-based aspect of 
individual and organizational interaction found length of service and salary (mirroring findings 
about household income) to be positively correlated with giving propensity. Likewise, position 
type was often significant, though not always in the same way (Agypt et al. 2012; Bekkers and 
Wiepking 2007; Borden et al. 2014; Knight 2004; Romney-Alexander 2001; Shaker et al. 2014). 
Moving up the multilevel continuum, mesolevel, or dyadic ties include the reciprocity between 
donors and nonprofits—including organizations’ solicitation approaches and related donor 
experiences (Barman 2007; Nesbit et al. 2012). One can argue that the employer is an 
intervening or mesolevel actor that “translates” the nonprofits’ charitable requests for employees 
and determines how the giving campaign will function. The organizational context where the 
campaign “host” company is, is likely an “actor” that constrains the campaign.  
The nature of the workplace and the campaign may therefore be relevant in campaign 
success. For example, Osili and colleagues (2011) discovered that workplace giving incidence 
increased as the company/organization size increased and that certain industries (for example, 
finance) had higher participation rates. Another perspective comes from literature regarding 
intraorganizational workplace campaigning. Shaker (2013), examining how universities raise 
money from employees, found that smaller institutions tended toward higher rates of 
participation but more modest individual gift amounts. Shaker and colleagues’ (2014) higher 
education congruent case study determined that campaign deployment did not necessarily lead to 
better rates of participation or higher giving levels.  
Macro/Outside Dynamics 
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Barman’s (2007) work proposes that neither the microlevel nor the meso/dyadic ties 
perspectives fully articulate the environment in which a gift is requested and a gift is given. 
Barman joins Bekkers and Wiepking (2011a) in suggesting that outside mechanisms are 
important and that scholars should consider the organizational or community environment. This 
macrolevel perspective posits that organizations and donors are embedded in a contextual setting 
that can constrain (and facilitate) their actions. The workplace provides a perspective to consider 
how a particular actor/entity (in this case, the employer) and the correlated campaign strategies 
may relate to giving. The workplace is a lens for exploring the environmental consequences in a 
bounded setting. One prominent example is Barman’s (2007) research documenting the social 
shift from communities of place (for example, United Way giving) to communities of purpose 
(for example, donor choice models) for workplace giving. 
 Some scholarly analysis arguably spans the micro-, meso-, macrocontinuum. A few 
studies address aspects of social role, mobilization context, social exchange, and organizational 
identification and commitment (Agypt et al. 2012; Borden et al. 2014). However, these lack 
specific attention to the complexity of campaign deployment with organizational strategies and 
sanctions. An increasing number of scholars discuss individual- or microlevel attributes that 
drive workplace giving—most drawing on the interest in (and availability of data about) 
individual-level drivers of philanthropy. Again, some scholarship focuses on macrolevel drivers 
of giving (see Barman 2007) and some uses meso/dyadic attributes (Nesbit et al. 2012). Our 
purpose is to contextualize and analyze campaign strategies and recognize that these largely 
reflect meso/dyadic-level dynamics. In Figure 1, a visualization places these strategies primarily 
at the meso/dyadic level to reflect the employee’s relationship to their workplace. The model 
recognizes, however, overlap with other levels. Donor choice, for example, facilitates several of 
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the community (macro) attributes documented by Barman’s (2007) notions about shifting social 
norms in giving. 
- FIGURE 1 - 
Workplace Campaign Strategy Literature 
The following subsections review the literature about the four campaign strategies of 
interest and establish the study hypotheses. 
Donor Choice 
Donors prefer to be able to direct charitable funds to their chosen purposes and 
organizations (Bennett 2003). Workplace donor choice, which enables employee discretion in 
choosing the object(s) of their charitable gifts, is increasingly common. A campaign strategy that 
focuses on donor choice energizes  macro- and meso/dyadic-based giving dynamics (see Figure 
1). By offering increased choices, the employer facilitates broader social preferences for 
purpose-based giving and, specifically, facilitates more favorable meso/dyadic employee-
employer relationships by accommodating employee preferences. 
As recently as the 1990s only 10 percent of United Ways made choice available in their 
campaigns (Barman 2008). Qualitative (Byrne 2005; Knight 2004) and quantitative research 
(Haski-Leventhal 2013; Lund 1998; Romney-Alexander 2002) now discuss donor choice as a 
motivating determinant of workplace giving. One study focused on University of Washington’s 
and Washington State’s Combined Federal Campaigns (Krishnamurthy 2002). When the 
campaign added more charities, contributions increased without dimishing support for the 
original organizations. A survey of fundraising personnel (N = 164) showed a pattern among 
university faculty who prioritized restricted gifts to academics and scholarships—suggesting 
choice was preferred (March 2005). Barman (2007) found that purpose-based giving was 
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increasingly attractive compared to place-based giving, implying that donors preferred to select 
from a range of charitable purposes. Another study by Barman (2008) of United Way 
organizations (N= 337) concluded that younger and more-educated populations expected greater 
availability of donor choice, suggesting a generational and educational trajectory. Shaker (2013) 
discovered that university faculty who were major donors gave almost exclusively for 
specialized purposes, again implying the value of donor choice. The recent evidence suggests 
that workplace donor choice is overwhelmingly popular and an expected option. 
Hypothesis 1: Offering employees a choice of charitable beneficiaries will increase gift 
amounts in the workplace.  
Company Matching 
Incentivizing a gift from one individual or entity with a gift from another (a match) is a 
common fundraising tactic (Sanders, Smith, and Norton 2013). The premise is that the 
prospective donor will give or give more because their gift will be magnified. In our model (see 
Figure 1), matching strategies are viewed as examples of meso/dyadic-level dynamics. 
Employers and campaign managers seek to influence employees’ donative behavior through 
matching. 
Evidence shows that a match significantly affects donating and donation amounts 
(Karlan, List, and Shafir 2011). In one example, donors liked to generate matching support for 
charity; however, increases in the match ratio only minimally affected donations (Eckel and 
Grossman 2008). A consequence of matching programs may be that donors give less because 
they count the match contribution as a replacement for their own gift (see Meier 2007). Sanders 
and colleagues (2013) hypothesized that matches may be more relevant to those who give at 
higher levels. The magnitude of the match, the purpose of the donation, and the request timing 
might also be relevant.  
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 A policy of company matching donations—that is, when organizational donations/funds 
are offered as an incentive for employee donations—was the most important self-reported reason 
for giving among high-level (71 percent) and low-level donors (61 percent; albeit only minimally 
statistically significant) in one large Australian study (Haski-Leventhal 2013). It follows that 
donors and nondonors may respond differently to matching offers. In Shaker’s (2013) qualitative 
study of major university donors, the respondents valued the availability of a match, noting an 
effect on gift timing, size, and nature. In another study, alumni of a business school reported that 
employer matching of their charitable contributions could influence their gift size (Okunade and 
Berl 1997). Likewise, millennials and their managers self-reported a higher likelihood of 
participation if their gifts were matched (The Millennial Impact Project 2015). Noting the 
particular relationship between employees and employers, employees may especially appreciate 
the ability to direct company matching funds to their chosen charitable purpose. 
Hypothesis 2: A policy of companies’ matching employee gifts will relate positively to 
the likelihood of giving and the gift amount in the workplace. 
Public Recognition 
Giving campaigns often allow public donor identification (Andreoni and Petrie 2004). 
Publicity may relate to giving decisions (either positively or negatively), as may other social 
pressures (Silverman, Robertson, Middlebrook, and Drabman 1984; Smith and McSweeny 
2007). Our model (see Figure 1) incorporates public recognition strategies as examples of 
meso/dyadic-level dynamics where employers/campaign managers seek to influence employee 
giving by facilitating recognition opportunities. 
A few workplace studies assess the relative value of public recognition—that is, the 
publicizing donor names within the organization—though they tend to be qualitative, limited in 
scope, or both. Within the university context where the gifts were for internal needs, descriptive 
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studies of campaigns (Byrne 2005; Cardon 2009; Gray and Hohnstreiter 2012) emphasized 
various forms of recognition, from celebratory events to attention for participating units, as an 
impetus for giving. In other cases, the purpose for recognition was broader and discussed in 
organizational terms as, for example, an avenue for encouraging other potential donors (Knight 
2004; Shaker 2013). Millennial workplace donors, meanwhile, reported an interest in public 
recognition and incentives, such as competitions (The Millennial Impact Project 2015). Positive 
responses to public recognition most often centered upon group experiences associated with 
giving. 
 A Chinese study directly examined the roles of public recognition and associated 
pressures on workplace giving (Du, Zhao, and Zhang 2014). This research indicated that 
donating was (in some situations) “rarely voluntary,” and indeed obligatory. Pressure in the form 
of releasing lists of donors and donation amounts was negatively correlated with intentions to 
donate; the research did not examine the effect on donation amounts. This “flip side” of public 
recognition—when employees wanted to publicize their participation for fear of negative 
consequences—has parallels within the American workplace. Nesbit and colleagues’ (2012) 
university-based study reported that some individuals said that they donated as a form of self-
defense. Individual-level, public recognition, rather than group-centered recognition, generally 
garnered a negative response in the workplace research. 
In this study, public recognition is derived from self-reported data; how important is 
public recognition to the respondent’s workplace giving? Extending the literature, we predict that 
the role of public recognition might actually be negatively related to workplace giving.  
Hypothesis 3: The role of public recognition as a motivation for giving within the 
workplace will negatively relate to likelihood of giving and gift amount.  
Solicitation Support 
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Demonstrating giving through public recognition may be intertwined with donors’ 
responses to gift solicitation. “Solicitation”—or the very act of being asked to give and how one 
is asked—is an integral to the giving decision (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). An example of a 
meso/dyadic-level dynamic is where employers, campaign managers, or peers seek to influence 
employee giving behavior by leveraging different means of solicitation. 
Lund’s (1998) survey of United Way participants indicated a positive perception of 
volunteer leaders among those who contributed to the campaign. Likewise, use of “departmental 
representatives” was deemed a good strategy by the donor majority in a small qualitative portion 
of a larger university-based study (Knight 2004). In 2015’s The Millennial Impact Project  tudy, 
the millennial participants reported that both supervisors and coworkers influenced their giving, 
although coworkers more substantially so. March (2005), in a study of higher education 
fundraisers, discovered a perception that participation was most likely with solicitation by 
campaign supporters—peers, department chairs, the campaign chair—or by the university 
president. In the Chinese context, Du and colleagues (2014) noted that campaigns organized by 
peers rather than supervisors resulted in a higher intention to participate (and a perception of a 
lower degree of pressure). In a mail survey to over 200 faculty donors, “peer pressure” was one 
of the lowest rated forms of motivation (Holland 1997). Perhaps not surprisingly, given 
stereotypes about fundraising personnel, Holland’s (1997) participants said that neither phone 
calls nor visits from “professional fundraisers” were important in their gift decisions. When 
donors spoke about “professional fundraisers” and “peer pressure” versus questions framed in 
less leading language, differences of opinion emerged, explaining to some degree variation 
between study findings. In the present analysis, a question asked whether solicitation by an 
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employer or by a friend/associate were major motivators, minor motivators, or nonmotivators. In 
that context we hypothesized positive outcomes. 
Hypothesis 4: Solitication by the employer or a friend/associate will positively relate to 
likelihood of giving and gift amount in the workplace. 
Methodology 
The existing research provides important, if limited, insights from which we sought to 
develop an understanding of workplace giving characteristics within the campaign context. We 
hoped to advance both scholars’ and practitioners’ understanding of campaign strategy 
effectiveness in relation to donor choice, company matching, public recognition, and solicitation 
support.  
Data 
The data were drawn from a nationally representative survey on workplace giving 
administered in late 2008 by Knowledge Networks, a survey company that maintains a nationally 
representative panel. The survey was given to currently employed, full-time workers ages 
twenty-five and above and had a response rate of 71 percent. While the full sample was 
approximately 6,000 respondents, our analysis focused on those whose workplaces offered 
giving. This sample was 1,858 respondents. Respondents were asked about the presence of a 
workplace campaign, whether and how much they donated in the previous twelve months, and 
about select characteristics of their workplace campaign. The questionnaire included items about 
nonworkplace giving in the format of the Philanthropy Panel Study (see Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics [PSID] 2016). While some years old, the data are a source for other research (Osili et 
al. 2011) and offer insights into US workplace giving habits not available elsewhere. 
Measures 
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Our dependent variable of interest was employee giving to their workplace campaigns. 
We examined incidence of giving and logged amounts of giving through the workplace using 
questions asked directly of the respondents (see Appendix A).1 Respondents were asked if they 
had donated (separate questions for workplace and nonworkplace) and, if they had, how much. 
For the ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis, the gift amount was put into logarithmic form, a 
common transformation used to help limit any undue influence of outlier values. 
 We conditioned the analyses on whether the respondent reported availability of a 
workplace giving campaign of any sort for continuity (between workplace or nonworkplace 
giving). For our independent variables of interest, we included whether the campaign offered 
observed opportunities to aid in and/or incentivize giving. These included donor choice and 
donor matching. The donor choice question was asked only of respondents who reported giving 
through the workplace and could not be used to test incidence. We included additional variables 
for possible influences: whether the employer or a coworker requesting gifts would be a 
motivating factor in the giving decision, and whether public recognition for giving influenced the 
respondents. For robustness, we completed several analyses split by gender, age (see Appendix 
B), and industry of employment (Appendix C and Appendix D).  
The industry splits are presented in the appendix as a sample of the differences that 
emerged. These analyses recognize that giving strategies like donor choice and matching may 
not be randomly distributed across companies/industries nor equally influential across key 
demographics like age and gender, suggesting a study limitation.  
                                                 1 In some instances we also examined incidence of nonworkplace giving for comparison and context. 
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For hypothesis 1, the question examining thedonor choice was, “Did you have the option 
to direct all or a portion of your workplace campaign donation to a specific nonprofit 
organization or cause in the past twelve months?”  
For hypothesis 2, the question examining the availability of employer matching began, 
“To your knowledge, what types of charitable giving is your employer involved in?”  and offered 
“Matching employee donations to charities” as one choice. These first two questions were asked 
in a yes/no format.  
For hypothesis 3, the question examining public recognition  began, “When you make 
donations to a workplace campaign, how important is it to you that the workplace campaign 
organization . . . ” One of the provided options was “Give public recognition for my donation.” 
The format of the question asked respondents to indicate whether this was very unimportant, 
somewhat unimportant, neutral, somewhat important, or very important.  
For hypothesis 4, the question examining solicitation support began, “Indicate whether 
the following is a major motivation, minor motivation, or no motivation at all when you give to 
nonprofit organizations:” and included among the subheads: “Being asked by your employer” 
and “Being asked by a friend or associate,” which were used in this analysis. Respondents were 
asked whether each was a major reason, minor reason, or no reason. To be clear, the question 
and response options assumed that respondents had had this experience and could cite it as a 
major reason, minor reason, or no reason. 
For the analysis, we operationalized all the questions as binary variables, though 
nonbinary variants were tested for robustness with no significant differences in the results. 
Fordetail, including coding/recoding, please see Appendix A. 
Analysis and Results 
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Table 1 presents descriptive information about the study sample. The percentage of 
people who reported charitable gifts is higher than that shown in other surveys, such as the 
Philanthropy Panel Study, which reported a 64.2 percent incidence of giving during roughly the 
same time period (PSID 2016). We attribute this to the inclusion of only employed individuals, a 
population that tends to give more frequently than the unemployed (PSID 2016).  
-- TABLE 1 -- 
Separate analyses, probit and OLS regressions, were elected over a single tobit because 
the donor choice variable was asked only of those who reported giving through the workplace. 
The methods also underscore the two-part nature of giving: the decision to give (probit) and, if 
affirmative, how much to give (OLS). For all regression models, the weights included with the 
survey data were used. 
While OLS is typically the standard analysis, a basic binary (yes/no) analysis, like probit, 
was useful in this study because different factors may influence the decision to give in 
comparison with decision of how much to give. Importantly, these influences do not necessarily 
operate in the same direction. If a factor induces a small gift from someone who otherwise would 
not donate, this factor could present as positive in the probit but negative in the OLS. If only one 
of these analyses were completed, this effect may not have been captured. Our standard controls 
included microlevel factors: age, income, education, and gender, which are discussed in the next 
section. 
Microlevel, Demographic Results 
We began with the probit analyses for context, examining factors that shaped whether the 
employees gave (Table 2, probit marginal effects reported). Educational level is not significant in 
participation in workplace giving, though it is externally. Respondents making $100,000-
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$149,000 (omitted category is below $50,000) were more likely to give at work and outside of 
work. Age was significant in both contexts and gender was not significant in either. In the OLS 
analyses, in the workplace, being better paid and more highly educated were positive and 
significantly correlated with larger gifts (Table 3). Age was also significant in gift amounts while 
gender was not.  
-- TABLE 2 -- 
-- TABLE 3 -- 
Meso/dyadic-level and Macrolevel Results 
 We examined the meso/dyadic-level (donor choice, matching, recognition, solicitation 
support) and macrolevel (donor choice) dynamics.  
Hypothesis 1: Donor Choice 
As predicted, donor choice was positively correlated with the amount given through the 
workplace (Table 3). This finding confirmed our first hypothesis. Holding all other variables 
constant, the presence of donor choice increased workplace donations by $58 for those already 
donating through the workplace.2 Indeed, donor choice emerged as the key driver for gift 
amounts. 
Hypothesis 2: Company Matching 
The presence of company matching donations was found to be positive and significant on 
its own in giving incidence and amount (Tables 2 and 3). Holding all other variables constant, the 
presence of company matching increased the incidence of workplace giving by almost 8 percent. 
This suggested some support for our second hypothesis. However, when considered with a donor 
choice dummy variable (available only for the OLS model and presented in Table 3), company 
                                                 2 The value is the difference between two expected values, calculated from the regression results while holding all other variables at means. This calculation is reproduced for all significant findings. 
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matching had only a slightly positive effect on the gift amount, which was not statistically 
significant.  
Hypothesis 3: Public Recognition 
The employee’s response to public recognition had a nonsignificant but negative effect 
on giving in the workplace in incidence and amount (Tables 2 and 3). We draw from this little 
conclusive support for the hypothesis. The preference for public recognition may have been 
considered a socially undesirable response, perhaps leading respondents to view recognition 
negatively and to be less likely to respond positively. This may have led to an underestimation of 
recognition’s effects.  
Related to this, we also recognize that our nonfindings may be attributed to the 
limitations of the available data to more precisely differentiate between (1) how important 
respondents’ self-reported preference was for public recognition for their donation and (2) how 
bestowed public recognition actually influences workplace giving. The preferential versus 
observational distinction is a potentially important one that deserves future attention.  
Hypothesis 4: Solicitation Support 
We examined campaign “asks” by using two variables that allowed the respondent to list 
encouragement from either (1) the employer or (2) an associate or friend as a motivating factor in 
the gift decision. We called these solicitation support variables. The employer solicitiation 
support variable held a strong positive significance for whether an individual donated (a 9.1 
percent increase; Table 2). It had a negative (though nonsignificant) effect on the amount 
donated (Table 3). Being asked by a friend/associate did not motivate workplace participation 
and had a significant negative effect on gift amount. This signaled mostly negative, though 
inconclusive, findings for the fourth hypothesis. Employer encouragement may have moved 
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neutral individuals to donate, but these individuals did not seem to donate as much as those who 
did not need encouragement to give. Meanwhile, peer influence did not have the desired effects. 
Workplace relationships, therefore, were connected to donations in a complex manner. 
Discussion 
Bekkers and Wiepking’s (2011a) review of philanthropic mechanisms suggests that locus 
matters. They propose that giving mechanisms can be categorized as within, outside, or between 
potential donors. Past workplace and federated giving scholars have offered similar, parallel 
logic in noting micro-, meso/dyadic, and macrodynamics that influence workplace giving 
(Barman 2007; Nesbit et al. 2012). Much of the workplace research, indeed much of the general 
philanthropy research, has largely focused on the “within” mechanisms. In one workplace study, 
microlevel or “within” individual conditions were found to be more relevant than the presence of 
a campaign (a mesolevel construction intended to encourage donations) in predicting giving 
(Shaker et al. 2014). Our research engaged specific meso/dyadic-level campaign strategies to 
assist researchers and practitioners with the dynamics of workplace giving within the broad 
framework of philanthropic understanding.  
The first hypothesis explored how a strategy of donor choice related to the gift amount. 
Donor choice positively related to the extent of giving, demonstrating the promise of combined 
macro- and meso/dyadic-based campaign strategies.  
Tying our research to extant literature, donor choice is a strategy that may best reflect an 
“awareness of need” mechanism (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). Barman’s (2006) work 
evidenced shifting social understanding of needs as donors increasingly prioritized purpose-
based giving over place-based giving. Our nationwide study largely compliments Barman’s site-
specific work about San Francisco and Chicago. A strategy of offering donor choice reflects an 
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accommodation of shifting preferences towards purpose-based giving and, therefore, could 
explain its strong effect on campaign giving. Donor choice (and promotion of its availability) 
appears to be an effective tool for increasing workplace donation amounts. 
The second hypothesis examined the relationship between company matching and 
workplace giving. We found that company matching may be related to an individual’s decision 
to give at work, but company matching has little positive impact on the amount given. This may 
be particularly true when other strategies are present. In other words, when tested alongside 
donor choice, matching lost its significance in giving amount. Future research is needed to better 
distinguish competing/substitution effects of strategies upon one another. 
General philanthropic mechanisms like “efficacy”—that is, the total magnitude of the gift 
that can be amplified through employer matching—and “costs” (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a) 
may be slightly less important in the workplace giving context. Perhaps the ability to make gifts 
through payroll deduction, removing them before compensation is received, eases the burden of 
the fiscal “cost” of workplace philanthropy. One could also conjecture that the presence of a 
mediating body, such as the employer and/or a workplace giving federation, might reduce 
worker concerns regarding efficacy. Ultimately, this finding may limit the impact of 
meso/dyadic-level driven workplace tactics. 
The third hypothesis centered on the effect of an employee’s preference for public 
recognition as a motivation for giving in the workplace. We found no significant relationship 
between workplace giving and a self-reported preference for public recognition.  
The fourth hypothesis explored how campaign solicitation support related to workplace 
giving. We measured this by examining how the employers’ encouragement motivated the 
incidence and extent of giving. We found the perception of solicitation support from employers 
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to be significantly positive in giving likelihood but (nonsignificantly) negative in workplace gift 
amounts . Peer asks were not a motivating factor in giving decisions. Perhaps then, employer 
encouragement is a good strategy for participation goals but less so for reaching fiscal goals 
within campaigns. The question of how best to support a campaign “solicitation” 
strategy/mechanism with coworker volunteers is nuanced and heavily overshadowed by 
considerations of relational workplace dynamics (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). The 
meso/dyadic-level campaign strategy was of some, but limited, benefit in this case. 
This study has limitations. First, the data were cross-sectional and self-reported. The 
former condition limits our ability to make statements about causality and the latter prevents us 
from ruling out the possibility of same-source bias. Second, while we examined four major 
campaign strategies, this was certainly not an exhaustive list. Further, while we examined donor 
choice in relation to giving amount, due to survey construction we could not examine the role of 
donor choice in whether someone gave at work. Finally, no explicit measures of fully macrolevel 
variables appeared to influence workplace giving. This indicates the possibility of at least one 
source of omitted variable bias. We recommend Barman’s (2007) research to those with 
particular interests at the macrolevel but must rely on future analyses to fully incorporate micro-, 
meso/dyadic-, and macrolevel variables. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to contextualize and integrate workplace campaign 
strategies within a broader model of giving. We also sought to provide empirical evidence 
regarding the effectiveness of several campaign strategies: donor choice, donor matching, public 
recognition, and solicitation support. We largely conceptualized these strategies as meso/dyadic-
level dynamics (see Barman 2007; Nesbit et al. 2012). We relied on the literature to develop 
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hypotheses. Using a representative, national sample of workers, we tested these hypotheses in 
models that also included microlevel demographic controls. The results are summarized in an 
expanded Figure 2, which illustrates how we conceptualized and operationalized workplace 
giving strategies as well as the microlevel individual controls.  
- FIGURE 2 - 
The analysis leads to the conclusion that, after controlling for microlevel dynamics like 
individual demographics, meso/dydadic-level campaign approaches matter in varying degrees. 
We identified donor choice as a key strategy to encourage giving in the workplace. The 
importance of gift matching is less clear. Additionally, public recognition is an area in which to 
tread lightly given inconclusive findings. Finally, experimenting with campaign solicitors can be 
a tricky proposition.  
When thinking about “next-generation” employee donors, evidence suggests that our 
findings may not hold. For example, many of our results did not align with survey information 
that highlighted millennial perspectives on workplace giving (Achieve 2015). This supports the 
value of a deeper investigation of workplace behavioral data around questions of age and 
responsibility in order to generate more multifaceted findings.  
In the context of Bekkers and Wiepking’s (2011a) mechanisms, “awareness of need” 
(donor choice) and “solicitation” (solicitation support) stand out as prime candidates for attention 
in the workplace. Many of the same general philanthropic mechanisms are present in the 
workplace. Yet, future research is needed to determine just how different (or similar) workplace 
motivators are to nonworkplace factors. Research could enhance campaign planning and 
anticipate changes in employee responses to workplace solicitation given shifts in technology, 
worker-employer relations, and social norms. Ensuing research begs for refinement and testing 
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through application and experimentation. Few workplace-specific studies quantifiably examine 
employee responses to specific campaign strategies. This study was an early step in this 
direction. Opportunity is ample for further empirical and generalizable approaches to examining 
campaign tactics.  
Future researchers would be wise to explore the kinds of choices employees want and 
how those choices should be presented. Workplace trends are moving well ahead with a growing 
range of options for employees and employers. These tendencies could be leveraged based on 
research to make workplace giving more supportive and effective. Barman (2007) proposes that 
the macrolevel concerns—or context in which nonprofits and fundraisers must function—are 
fundamental elements that deserve attention. Potential donors experience the workplace as a 
“distinct area of social space, in which all the relevant actors are influenced by the overall 
structure” (Swedberg 2006, 6), making structural concerns highly pertinent. There appears to be 
an industry-specific component (see Appendix B and C), leaving open the possibility that certain 
industries (or sectors) are more or less likely to attract those interested in workplace giving and 
to encourage community involvement/support—a notion that has been explored in relation to 
volunteerism and employees (Ariza-Montes, Roldán-Salgueiro, and Leal-Rodríguez 2015; Lee 
and Brudney 2015)—or are possibly more likely to implement specific strategies. In the future, 
workplace fundraising campaign implementation and testing will be valuable for determining 
site-specific determinants of philanthropic behavior. Dicerning what works at work is a fertile 
arena for continued philanthropic research.  
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Figure 1. Integrating campaign strategies in a model of workplace giving 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Findings in an integrated model of giving 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of study variables (selected sample, workplace giving available 
only) 
 
VARIABLES Mean  
(% in category) 
SD Min Max 
Income        Up to $49,999 29.8%  0 1  $50,000 to $99,999 47.6%  0 1  $100,000 to $149,999 15.4%  0 1  $150,000 to $174,999 3.5%  0 1  $175,000 or more 3.8%  0 1 
Female 50.5%  0 1 
Age      22–47 59.5%  0 1  48–66 38.7%  0 1  67+ 1.9%  0 1 
Education [Bachelor’s or higher] 49.3%         
Gave to charity (nonworkplace) 86.5%  0 1 
Gave to charity (workplace) 64.0%  0 1 
Donor choice is offered* 78.4%  0 1 
Donor matching is offered 38.7%  0 1 
Public recognition is important 3.7%  0 1 
Solitication support: Employer asking is a motivator 49.6%  0 1 
Solicitation support: Friend/Associate asking is a motivator 72.3%  0 1 
Amount given (OLS donor-only sample; total giving) $1,340 $2,834 1 $41,500 
Amount given (OLS donor-only sample; workplace) $227 $541 1 $10,000      Observations 1,858         
* Was asked only of those who gave through the workplace 
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Table 2. Demographic and campaign strategy effects on employee participation in charitable 
giving (probit marginal effects)    
VARIABLES Nonworkplace 
Giving 
Workplace Giving 
Income [Below $50,000 omitted]     $50,000 to $99,999 0.0399 0.0489  (0.0345) (0.0433) $100,000 to $149,999 0.140*** 0.155***  (0.0312) (0.0498) $150,000 to $174,999 0.0856 0.0300  (0.0581) (0.0867) $175,000 and up 0.128*** 0.0334  (0.0485) (0.0849) 
Education [Bachelor’s or higher] 0.0462* 0.0407  (0.0260) (0.0353) 
Age [22–47 omitted]   48–66 0.0469* 0.113***  (0.0241) (0.0330) 67+ -0.0210 0.0315  (0.0829) (0.0980) 
Female 0.0328 -0.0186  (0.0268) (0.0345) 
Donor matching is offered  0.0324 0.0774**  (0.0271) (0.0353) 
Public recognition is important -0.0717 -0.145  (0.0773) (0.0991) 
Solicitation support: Employer asking is a motivator -0.0208 0.0851** 
 (0.0280) (0.0360) 
Solicitation support: Friend/Associate asking is a motivator 0.0299 0.0106  (0.0263) (0.0380)    Pseudo R-squared 0.052 0.033 Observations 1,848 1,848 All respondents who had workplace giving offered and answered all relevant questions included here. Coefficients are marginal effects form Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 3. Demographic and campaign strategy effects on employee charitable gift amount among 
donors (OLS) 
 
VARIABLES Workplace 
Giving, Donors 
Only, No Donor 
Choice Variable 
(Log) 
Workplace Giving, 
Donors Only, With 
Donor Choice 
Variable (Log) 
Income [up to $49,999 omitted]    
$50,000 to $99,999 0.471*** 0.534*** 
 (0.137) (0.147) 
$100,000 to $149,999 0.926*** 0.810*** 
 (0.159) (0.168) 
$150,000 to $174,999 1.021*** 1.133*** 
 (0.233) (0.244) 
$175,000 and up 1.325*** 1.178*** 
 (0.266) (0.283) 
Education [Bachelor’s or higher] 0.502*** 0.444*** 
 (0.121) (0.124) 
Age [22–47 omitted]   
48–66 0.232** 0.0927 
 (0.117) (0.123) 
67+ -0.148 -0.261 
 (0.217) (0.220) 
Female -0.0853 -0.151 
 (0.121) (0.128) 
Donor choice is offered  0.717*** 
  (0.125) 
Donor matching is offered 0.232** 0.121 
 (0.114) (0.120) 
Public recognition is important 0.0398 -0.00654 
 (0.508) (0.539) 
Solicitation support: Employer asking is a motivator -0.0546 -0.124 
 (0.126) (0.131) 
Solicitation support: Friend/Associate asking is a motivator -0.250* -0.239 
 (0.140) (0.149) 
Constant 3.602*** 3.310*** 
 (0.211) (0.227) 
   
R-squared 0.148 0.172 
Observations 1,084 1,084    Only respondents who gave through the workplace giving and answered all relevant questions included here. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1  
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A. Survey questions and coding strategy  
 
Question Original Format Modified Format 
Did you have the option to direct all or a 
portion of your workplace campaign 
donation to a specific nonprofit 
organization or cause in the past 12 
months? 
Yes = 1 
No = 2 
Don’t know = 3 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Don’t know = missing 
To your knowledge, what types of 
charitable giving is your employer involved 
in?  Matching employee donations to charities 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
When you make donations to a workplace 
campaign, how important is it to you that 
the workplace campaign organization Give public recognition for my donation 
 
Very Unimportant = 1 
Somewhat Unimportant = 2 
Neutral/No Opinion = 3 
Somewhat Important = 4 
Very Important = 5 
Very Important = 1 
Very Unimportant / Somewhat 
Unimportant / Neutral / 
Somewhat Important = 0 
(Note: Other formats tested for 
robustness, no significant 
changes) 
Indicate whether the following is a major 
motivation, minor motivation, or no 
motivation at all when you give to nonprofit 
organizations:  
 Being asked by your employer 
 Being asked by a friend or associate 
 
Major Motivation = 1 
Minor Motivation = 2 
No Motivation at All = 3 
Major/Minor Motivation = 1 
No Motivation at All = 0 
(Note: Other formats tested for 
robustness, no significant 
changes) 
* None of the questions had a “check all that apply” option 
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Table B. Demographic and campaign strategy effects on employee participation in charitable 
giving and amounts, with industry effects (probit marginal effects; OLS with donors only)     
VARIABLES Nonworkplace 
Giving 
Workplace 
Giving 
Workplace 
Giving, 
Donors 
Only (Log) 
Income [Below $50,000 omitted]       
$50,000 to $99,999 0.0380 0.0371 0.550*** 
 (0.0335) (0.0420) (0.148) 
$100,000 to $149,999 0.139*** 0.145*** 0.819*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0488) (0.165) 
$150,000 to $174,999 0.0874 0.0328 1.156*** 
 (0.0570) (0.0849) (0.244) 
$175,000 and up 0.124** 0.00708 1.197*** 
 (0.0501) (0.0871) (0.285) 
Education [Bachelor’s or higher] 0.0596** 0.0643* 0.483*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0347) (0.131) 
Age [22–47 omitted]    
48–66 0.0443* 0.119*** 0.0904 
 (0.0241) (0.0327) (0.126) 
67+ -0.00372 0.0644 -0.243 
 (0.0769) (0.0924) (0.222) 
Female 0.0454* 0.00734 -0.114 
 (0.0271) (0.0349) (0.151) 
Industry [Health, Services, & Recreation omitted]    
Finance, Trade, Tech, & Management 0.00368 0.0716* 0.0604 
 (0.0314) (0.0383) (0.147) 
Primary & Secondary Industries 0.0801** 0.146*** 0.212 
 (0.0338) (0.0513) (0.207) 
Donor choice is offered   0.716*** 
   (0.122) 
Donor matching is offered  0.0228 0.0458 0.0595 
 (0.0288) (0.0367) (0.120) 
Public recognition is important  -0.0638 -0.130 0.0247 
 (0.0745) (0.0976) (0.541) 
Solicitation support: Employer asking is a motivator -0.0205 0.0868** -0.122 
 (0.0271) (0.0354) (0.134) 
Solicitation support: Friend/Associate asking is a motivator 0.0338 0.0231 -0.223 
 (0.0251) (0.0366) (0.149) 
    
Pseudo R-squared 0.064 0.042 0.177 
Observations 1,841 1,841 1,077 In columns 1 & 2, all respondents who had workplace giving offered and answered all relevant questions were included. In column 3, only respondents who gave through the workplace giving and answered all relevant questions were included. Coefficients are marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table C. Marginal effects on giving incidence, split by industry (probit marginal effects) 
  
 
Workplace 
Giving 
Workplace 
Giving 
Workplace 
Giving 
VARIABLES 
Health 
Services 
Rec 
Finance, 
Trade, Tech, 
Management 
Primary & 
Secondary 
Ind 
Income [Below $50,000 omitted]       
$50,000 to $99,999 0.0754 -0.0834 0.0848 
 (0.0628) (0.0595) (0.0961) 
$100,000 to $149,999 0.191** 0.0519 0.0973 
 (0.0797) (0.0682) (0.107) 
$150,000 to $174,999 0.0913 -0.0913 0.163 
 (0.124) (0.114) (0.131) 
$175,000 and up 0.166 -0.00105 -0.310* 
 (0.129) (0.0933) (0.172) 
Education [Bachelor’s or higher] 0.110** -0.0181 0.0711 
 (0.0546) (0.0511) (0.0647) 
Age [22–47 omitted]    
48–66 0.153*** 0.0941** 0.0588 
 (0.0530) (0.0432) (0.0696) 
67+ -0.0100 0.170* 0.110 
 (0.137) (0.0980) (0.195) 
Female -0.00226 -0.0102 0.0565 
 (0.0547) (0.0500) (0.0756) 
Donor matching is offered  -0.0845 0.111** 0.174*** 
 (0.0619) (0.0481) (0.0672) 
Public recognition is important  -0.167 -0.0409 -0.134 
 (0.133) (0.144) (0.162) 
Solicitation support: Employer asking is a motivator 0.107* 0.0488 0.142** 
 (0.0555) (0.0505) (0.0720) 
Solicitation support: Friend/Associate asking is a motivator 0.0464 0.0579 -0.0579 
 (0.0585) (0.0536) (0.0726) 
    
Observations 751 781 309 All respondents who had workplace giving offered and answered all relevant questions included here. Columns split by industry classification. 
Robust see form in parentheses    
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1    
 
  
  
 34 
Table D. Effects on giving campaign characteristics (probit marginal effects)       VARIABLES Workplace Giving Offered Donor Matching Offered Donor Choice Offered 
Income [Below $50,000 omitted]      $50k–$99k 0.0895*** 0.0393 0.00881  (0.0237) (0.0338) (0.0375) $100k–$150k 0.0933*** 0.0911** 0.0621  (0.0308) (0.0392) (0.0401) $150k–$175k 0.0748 0.212*** 0.0178  (0.0479) (0.0656) (0.0826) $175k+ 0.0567 0.175*** 0.0420  (0.0459) (0.0585) (0.0584) 
Education (less than college omitted)    Bachelor’s or higher 0.125*** -0.00686 0.00429  (0.0210) (0.0283) (0.0307) 
Age [22–47 omitted]    48–66 0.00708 -0.0425 0.0618**  (0.0205) (0.0267) (0.0289) 67+ -0.213*** 0.0357 0.0634  (0.0572) (0.0815) (0.0707) 
Female 0.0377* 0.0117 -0.0595*  (0.0207) (0.0279) (0.0308) 
Industry [Health, Services, & Recreation omitted]    Finance, Trade, Tech, & Management -0.0294 0.244*** -0.0671** 
 (0.0221) (0.0284) (0.0322) Primary & Secondary Industries -0.0933*** 0.314*** -0.0103  (0.0308) (0.0443) (0.0458)     Observations 5,764 2,801 1,764 All respondents who had workplace giving offered and answered all relevant questions included here. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1   
    
 
 
